File Japon

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Le soleil se leve à l'est

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Raphaël KANZA - Schröder «Le Japon, notre coup de coeur pour investir en 2005»




Le potentiel boursier des différentes zones géographiques en 2005 varie du tout au tout. Aux Etats-Unis, les investisseurs ont déjà largement anticipé la progression attendue des bénéfices des entreprises pour l'an prochain, ce qui nous incite à sous-pondérer cette région. Ce n'est pas le cas en Europe, où les actions se traitent en moyenne avec une décote de 33 % par rapport à leurs homologues américaines.

Cet écart est appelé à se réduire, même si le net redressement de la rentabilité des entreprises de la zone euro touche à sa fin. Autre atout des actions européennes : leur rendement devrait rester attrayant l'an prochain. Les sociétés vont en effet continuer à puiser dans leur trésorerie et à utiliser les liquidités générées par leur exploitation pour verser de généreux dividendes.

A côté des valeurs européennes, notre thème majeur d'investissement pour l'année 2005 consiste à surpondérer la zone asiatique, et plus particulièrement le Japon. La croissance des résultats des entreprises japonaises devrait en effet être nettement plus rapide que celle prévue en Europe (10 à 15 % par an attendu à moyen terme, contre 5 % anticipés sur le Vieux Continent) grâce aux lourds programmes de restructurations et de réductions des coûts mis en oeuvre au cours de ces dernières années. A cela s'ajoute une sous-valorisation significative du marché japonais par rapport aux autres places financières. A titre d'exemple, les actions japonaises se paient moins de 8 fois l'excédent brut d'exploitation rapporté à la valeur d'entreprise (capitalisation + endettement net), alors que ce ratio atteint 10,5 pour les titres américains.

[scro13]

et se couche à l'ouest

[padmee]

Semaine du 14 mars — prévisions
Lundi 14 mars
Japon-Balance des paiements (milliards ¥)

Nov dec janv
balance courante 1 204 1 616 780
cvs 1 386 17 77 1 390

[padmee]

La Vie Financière - le Magazine



Belle percée des fonds actions Japon

Anne Michel
n° 3118
paru le 11/03/2005





Si les fonds actions enregistrent une hausse de 1,25 %, en moyenne, sur la semaine du 25 février au 4 mars, les produits actions japonaises se distinguent avec une progression de 2,4 %. Ce qui porte leur performance depuis janvier à 4,7 %. Beaucoup d'experts sont positifs sur la poursuite des bons résultats des fonds japonais en 2005, année qui pourrait d'ailleurs signer le début d'une reprise économique solide. Schroders pointe notamment le fort potentiel de croissance des bénéfices des entreprises nippones. « Ces dernières ont les moyens et la motivation de faire croître leurs bénéfices de 10 à 12 % par an au cours des deux et trois prochaines années », précise l'établissement. De leur côté, les niveaux de valorisation de ces titres seraient aujourd'hui attrayants. Par ailleurs, les fonds or et matières premières restent séduisants avec 2 % de hausse sur la période considérée (et 12,26 % depuis janvier). Constat similaire pour les produits actions françaises. Signalons, enfin, la très légère consolidation des fonds Europe de l'Est (- 0,28 % sur la semaine), une catégorie qui demeure leader avec plus de 15 % de performance sur deux mois

[CLAUDEH]

Bonne initiative Padmee...........................

---

NIKKEI 225 - Vue weekly - Au 11 mars 2005

[riteam]

En effet padmee


Cliquez pour agrandir

Je me permet de completer avec une vue à la fourche.
Mini ML blanche en résistance, en cas franchissement ça deviendrait interessant.

[padmee]

Merci les gars, je suis long sur un fond,

Why Trade Deficits Matter
Bretton Woods 2, A Review
If Only Asia Would Let the Dollar Fall
It May Take More Than High Rates
An Unprecedented Stability
A 'Mixed Model' Microeconomic Disequilibrium
Home Again, Sort Of and Hedge Funds

By John Mauldin
March 4, 2005

We have been looking at the US trade deficit and the global trade imbalance for
the past two weeks. It is currently an unsustainable trend, and thus will stop
at some point. The questions are when and how? We will conclude this series
today, looking at several ways the trade deficit could come back into line.

First, a very quick review. For those who remember, you can skip to the next
heading. (And for those who would like to read the previous letters, you can go
to www.2000wave.com and look in the archives.)

The first Bretton Woods system came about when representatives of most of the
world's leading nations met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944 to create a
new international monetary system.

Under the Bretton Woods system, central banks of countries other than the US
were given the task of maintaining fixed exchange rates between their currencies
and the dollar. They did this by intervening in foreign exchange markets. If a
country's currency was too high relative to the dollar, its central bank would
sell its currency in exchange for dollars, driving down the value of its
currency. Conversely, if the value of a country's money was too low, the country
would buy its own currency, thereby driving up the price.

The dollar became the world's reserve currency. Yet there were limits placed
upon each country and especially the US. Each country had to police its own
reserves and currency or be forced to revalue. And the US was constrained
because the dollar was fully convertible into gold. This changed in 1971 when
Nixon closed the gold window.

Now we have what many are coming to call a Bretton Woods 2 system. That is where
much of the world, but primarily the Asian countries, have more or less
informally agreed to peg their currencies to the dollar. They do this in order
to maintain their relative competitive ability to sell their products to the
world and specifically to the US.

The competitive devaluation game that this has spawned is even more unstable
than the original Bretton Woods. Asian countries are now taking US dollars that
are going to be worth less at some future point than they are today. As I showed
last week, the losses they will experience are not some paper transaction,
costless central bank game. These will be real losses of buying power and in
some countries can mean significant (I mean quite large in terms of GDP) loss of
cash reserves, especially for some of the smaller Asian economies.

How can we get an understanding of how and why the system might unravel? I think
the best model is to look at game theory. In game theory, the Nash equilibrium
(named after John Nash) is a kind of optimal strategy for games involving two or
more players, whereby the players reach an outcome to mutual advantage. If there
is a set of strategies for a game with the property that no player can benefit
by changing his strategy while (if) the other players keep their strategies
unchanged, then that set of strategies and the corresponding payoffs constitute
a Nash equilibrium.

After showing that the international devaluation game and the accumulation of
massive amounts of US dollar reserves in Asia is a significant factor in holding
down long term US rates, I go on to the following conclusion:

"The interesting exercise for us is to try and understand how all the "players"
in the game will act. What kind of odd Nash equilibrium will they settle into?
Will they all share some pain so as to lessen the total amount of pain, or will
they seek to avoid as much personal pain as possible thereby causing more pain
for everyone else? I am not entirely optimistic, given the current level of the
"vacuous rhetoric of globalization." But one can always hope. It will take more
than a few beautiful minds to work this equilibrium equation out."

In this game, the dollar becomes the "Old Maid," with Asian countries buying
each other's currencies with their reserve dollars in an effort to reduce their
exposure to the dollar without also causing a rise in their own currency. A
tricky Nash equilibrium game indeed.

Why Trade Deficits Matter?

There is a school of thought that trade deficits do not matter in a modern
context. They would contend we are measuring the deficit with tools which were
adequate in the past, but which now do not take into account the far higher
margins in US business and the intellectual capital and wealth we are in fact
creating.

It is true that many Asian businesses, especially Chinese businesses, operate on
profit margins that are amazingly small. When Apple imports billions of dollars
of I-Pods creating a US trade deficit, it also creates and keeps 90% of the
profits attached to the I-Pod all along the manufacturing and selling chain.
Which is more valuable, Apple or the factories which manufacture the I-Pods?
Thus it makes sense, does it not, that money would want to come to the US to buy
Apple and other high margin businesses?

Except the vast majority of money coming to the US is not buying Apple, but US
treasuries, which are demonstrably low margin and if you are buying with a
foreign currency, a depreciating asset.

I can see the point if we were talking about a trade deficit of 2-3% of GDP, but
we are now talking about 6% trade deficits on our way to 7%. This is
unprecedented in world history. We are absorbing 90% or more of the total world
savings. Our deficits are growing faster than world savings. This is an
unsustainable trend. Thus it will end.

While I do not subscribe to this view, the margin of profits in Asia, and
especially China, is going to come up again in a few paragraphs.

If Only Asia Would Let the Dollar Fall

There is another school of thought that suggests the problem with global
imbalances could be solved if the dollar would correct against the Asian
currencies. This seems to be the consensus view. If Asia would simply allow the
dollar to fall, thus raising prices of their products to us, that would mean we
could not buy as much of their "stuff," and our "stuff" would be cheaper on
world markets. If we buy less and sell more, then the trade balance improves.

Yet this has not worked so far. Since the peak of the dollar three years ago,
exports have indeed risen by 35%, from $55 billion to $71 billion. But imports
have risen by 50%, from $86 billion to over $131 billion.

Proponents of this thinking would point out that the trade weighted dollar has
not moved that much at all. And specifically, the Asian currencies have hardly
budged. Just you wait, when China and Japan allow their currencies to rise, it
will make all the difference. When prices rise, we will buy less. It is the law
of supply and demand.

I have a problem with this view as well. First, it is not altogether clear that
prices will rise all that much in the short-term. The euro has risen 50% in that
time, and while there has been some rise in the cost of European imports, most
of the hit has been taken by European companies and not US consumers.

Further, Chinese inflation is around 4%. Since they are pegged to the dollar,
for all intents and purposes they have outsourced their monetary policy to the
Fed and Alan Greenspan. While that policy is still "easy" in the US after 7 rate
hikes, it is enormously easy from a Chinese perspective. Inflation should be
running at a much higher rate in China. But it isn't. My bet is that all the
capital investment in business and infrastructure is also paying off there in
increased productivity, which can offset inflation pressures.

Let's say the Chinese do allow the Renminbi to increase by 5-10% in the coming
year. Big Deal. Their businesses would absorb some of the cost, just like Europe
is doing, and their increasing productivity would absorb even more.

Plus, what does a 10% rise in the cost of labor in China mean to US buyers of
products? Almost nothing.

It would take a massive revaluation of the dollar to have some real impact. But
be careful what you wish for. You might get it - real price increases in our
import costs, which would be inflationary. Since imports are approximately 15%
of GDP (and rising, given the price of oil), a modest 10% increase in prices
would mean a 1.5% rise in inflation. What if the dollar dropped 30% over a few
years? It could get ugly. Yet 30% is well within what many in the mainstream
think the dollar would fall if the Renminbi and the yen were allowed to float.
That would mean significant inflation pressures.

Yes, I know that is simplistic, but it roughly makes the point, even if the
actual equation is vastly more complicated. Rising foreign product prices will
eventually translate into the CPI.

This will cause the bond vigilantes, and presumably the Fed, to raise rates to
hold down inflation. Rising rates at some point are not good for housing
construction or values. That is a prescription for an eventual recession.

It May Take More Than High Rates

There is yet another school of thought, and Stephen Roach is probably its best
spokesman. He thinks it will take both a fall in the dollar and a rise in
interest rates. A rise in rates will encourage the consumer to save, as well as
reduce the amount of money available to spend because of increased borrowing
costs.

"Global rebalancing does not occur spontaneously. It takes adjustments in
economic policies and asset prices to spark a meaningful realignment in the mix
of global growth. Shifts in currencies and real interest rates are the two major
instruments of rebalancing. The ideal prescription for today's lopsided US-
centric world would be a combination of dollar weakness and a rise in US real
interest rates. However, there is serious risk that the Fed will not execute the
full-blown normalization of real interest rates that the US economy requires. If
that's the case, then there will be even greater pressure on currency
adjustments to correct today's imbalances - a development that could take world
financial markets by great surprise."

"...Given the reduced currency elasticities of exports and imports that have
been evident over the past decade - most likely an outgrowth of intensified
globalization - my guess is that it would have to take at least another 30-40%
drop in the broad dollar to get the job done. Quite simply, that would be an
intolerable outcome for the rest of the world. And that's where real interest
rates come into play - as the primary instrument to temper the excesses of US
domestic demand growth and the increasingly high import component of that
demand."

I agree with Roach that "Ultimately, the import content of the US trade deficit
can only be reduced by a compression in the growth of domestic demand." But I am
not certain that higher rates alone will be the cause of a compression of
domestic demand. They may be the trigger, but to really affect imports,
something significant must happen to the American consumer psyche.

Let me be clear about what I think Roach is saying but cannot say directly. He
is referring to the "R" word - Recession. Rates that would be high enough to
slow (compress) consumer demand must be high enough to raise borrowing costs.
They must be high enough to significantly slow down home equity loans for new
consumption.

That will mean lower new home construction, a slower real estate market and thus
slower increases or even (gasp) a fall in home values, and slower or no
increases in consumer spending growth. Reduced home construction and falling
("compression" sounds so much gentler than falling!) consumer spending. In
short, a recession.

The mirror of the recession of a few years ago, when housing and consumer
spending did not stop their growth, and the brunt of the pain fell on business.
During the last recession we had falling rates and massive stimulus.

Far be it from me to quibble with Roach, who is far smarter than I am, but
again, I am not certain that this is the complete picture. I think there is more
to it than a falling dollar and interest rates.

It is quite easy for the world to lay the blame for the trade deficit at the
feet of the profligate US consumer, helpless in his desire for more stuff,
spending beyond his means. And on a macro level, when looking at the entire
country, that is true. But it is not the whole picture.

The fact is that the US consumer is in pretty good shape on an individual basis,
or at least thinks he is. Our national wealth and income are at all time highs.
Our ability to service our debt is well within our income. While "savings" are
not growing, we are in fact saving in our pensions and homes and stocks, which
do not count in the national savings rate. If this were not true, we would not
be at all-time highs in wealth and income.

On an individual basis, most Americans think they are OK. While they might want
less debt, they believe they have a plan to deal with it. Yes, I understand all
the bad data, the anecdotal horror stories of debt, but I am talking about the
vast majority of Americans, not the subjects of the stories.

An Unprecedented Stability

Americans have experienced almost 25 years of an unprecedented increase in
stability. Yes, even with the bursting of a bubble and two wars, the world for
most Americans is far more financially stable than it was for most Americans in
1980.

And not only an increase in stability, but a decrease in volatility. Home prices
seem destined to rise. The last two recessions have been the mildest on record.
Part of the reason, for good or ill, is that the US is no longer dominated by
manufacturing. In the past, recessions meant large lay-offs at manufacturing
companies. While that is still the case today, manufacturing is a smaller part
of the economy, and thus the impact of lay-offs is smaller.

The experience of most people is that their job and income is secure during a
recession. There are other reasons for this, which Barry Ritholtz will deal with
in next week's Outside the Box.

Bottom line, the American consumer is comfortable with taking on more risk than
in the past. Thus, he sees real little reason to change his consumer spending
habits, or increase his savings.

A 'Mixed Model' Microeconomic Disequilibrium

Now, let's look at a final way of looking at the problems of the trade deficit.
It is not the problem of intellectual capital or a too high dollar or a
profligate consumer. It is structural. It is systemic in nature, and will need
much more than a lower dollar and higher rates to solve it.

This has been my view, but I was sent a report this week by my friends at
Absolute Return Partners in London by Woodie Brock, the founder of Strategic
Economic Decisions (www.sedinc.com) of Chandler, Arizona, who gives us a good
place to begin, as he commented upon Roach's position. He says it quite well:

"A 'Mixed Model' Microeconomic Disequilibrium: The problems underlying today's
imbalances run so deep that neither a weaker dollar nor higher rates will solve
the problem of the US trade deficit. ... The real culprit lies much deeper in
the phenomenon of a 'mixed model' disequilibrium.

"Specifically, the US adheres closely to a textbook model of microeconomics in
which all three factor markets (capital, labor, and product) are deregulated and
flexible. Europe possesses a different model that tolerates much more rigidity
in product and labor markets than in the US, as has been amply documented in
studies by McKinsey and Co., by OECD economists in Paris, and by others.
Finally, Japan and China possess a third model that deviates still further from
textbook desiderata. It is characterized by extreme mercantilism, disregard for
intellectual property rights, lack of transparency, repressed domestic
consumption at the expense of investment, and currency market intervention
(Japan) and pegging (China).

"Three inconsistent models are thus at work simultaneously. The imbalances
(disequilibria) that everyone now complains about are the result of the workings
of this "mixed model".

"Perhaps a better way to make this point is to perform the following 'thought
experiment': Suppose that, during the past 25 years, all major trading partners
had followed the model of textbook microeconomics. Then few of today's
imbalances would or in certain cases could exist."

The US trade deficit could not exist without Asian willingness to buy our debt
in a sort of vendor financing scheme. Such a debt could not exist if Asian
governments were not willing to take the risk of actual losses on their dollar
holdings, as private businesses with a profit motive would not have done so.

In essence, their governments have held down the value of the buying power of
their citizens in order to grow the business capacity of their corporate sector.
Has it been a good trade so far for them? It would be hard to say it was not for
them. But it is not a trade without risks, both to them and to the world.

There are no free economic lunches. When governments mess around with the free
market, there are costs. In this case, we have deferred the cost to the future.
But it is still there.

Whatever happened to the powerful growth that a European Union was supposed to
bring? Germany and France are mired in slow or no growth economies, with massive
10% (or more) unemployment. As Old Europe has taxed (literally) its growth
capacity, created a work environment that is non-competitive, and created a
socialist state that is increasingly incapable of funding itself, it has choked
off consumer spending and economic growth. This will all be compounded by the
demographic tsunami about to hit Europe.

Instead of being a growth engine that could, and should, drive the world, Old
Europe is simply an ad hoc collection of nations mired in costly bureaucracies.
(That will get a few letters.)

Let's return to the conclusion of Brock's analysis:

"Conclusion: In all quarters, there is a failure to understand that what is
killing the global system is the cumulative damage over 20 years of the workings
of today's mixed model disequilibrium. If we are right in this assessment, then
neither a drop in the dollar nor higher real interest rates will cure the
problem of today's macro-imbalances. Both Roach and the consensus are thus
probably wrong.

"Radical microeconomic policy reform is needed in which all players would
realign their models towards that of the textbook microeconomics. There is only
one such textbook model - taught around the world in economics courses from
Berkeley to the Sorbonne. And the US model better approximates this than do its
principal trading partners. Interestingly, it is French economists at the OECD
who most strongly argue this point.

"Inevitably, it will be very difficult to push through the kind of politically
painful micro-reforms that are needed. Game theoretically, the Nash equilibrium
point of the underlying policy-reform-game is the familiar pass-the-buck
strategy whereby each nation does little on its own, and urges "the other guys
to get their houses in order." Regrettably, absent needed microeconomic changes,
today's imbalances will worsen and the long run denouement will probably be a
collapse of the dollar. This will of course precipitate a whole new set of
problems.

"For the reasons we have identified, the world is in a mess and we are very
concerned about the long-run outcome."

I am not quite so pessimistic as to see a collapse of the dollar, unless by that
Brock means a 30% drop. 30% is something we have lived through more than once
without significant problems. I also think this will play out over a longer
period than most of us would think.

Let's look at one scenario. Remember, all players in this game can see the
problems. And all players want to avoid as much pain as possible. This is not
some game where China buys a great deal of our debt and then sells it, crashing
our markets out of some supposed geo-political conspiracy theory.

For better or worse, they are married to our markets. To be a little rough, but
it is a good analogy; they drink the water from our pond. It would not be in
their interests to foul it. The problem is to balance global trade without
strangling the world economy.

Each major group and nation is going to have to take a little pain willingly, or
everyone takes a whole lot more pain collectively. Asia needs to start allowing
the dollar to gently fall - can we say measured? That will not be fun, but it is
a first step.

The US, MUST begin to balance its federal budget. Fiscal discipline must be the
order of the day. This will not be fun, but it will reduce the need for foreign
financing and decrease the systemic risk of a dollar collapse.

Europe must free up its markets, encourage internal consumption, lower its
structural costs and get a central bank that does not wear black leather and
carry whips and chains. Sado-monetarism, indeed.

Whether from rising US rates or simply the end of a cycle, the US will
eventually fall into recession. The engine of global growth will sputter, and
this time it will be the consumer that is the problem. Whether that is in 2006
or 2007 or even later, it will happen. The business cycle has not been repealed.

You can count on a major stock market decline in the next recession. The average
decline is 43% in a recession. Can we say Dow 6,000? That means many boomers,
who are only a few years from retirement, are going to be very disappointed, to
say the least.

Do you want to see an increase in US savings? Think 5-15 years to retirement and
not enough money to retire. The next recession will shatter the confidence for
the Boomer generation in the stock market. They will no longer be able to count
upon a rising stock market to enable them to retire at the level to which they
had intended to become accustomed. At that point, the long run for them will be
tomorrow.

This, along with a potential slump in housing values, will do more to change the
American consumer psyche than high rates or rising prices from a lower dollar.

This for me is the trigger for the Muddle Through Economy for the decade which I
am forecasting. Oh, I forgot to mention that a consumer recession in the US will
not be good for Asia or the world. This also forces Asia to find new sources for
sales. They will have to look inward. As will Europe.

I think the chances that we can skate through the trade imbalance with no effect
upon the world or the US to be a probability of only 10%. I think the soft
depression that Bill Bonner and others see is a 20% chance. Such a dire event
will require serious mistakes upon the part of governments, like protectionist
legislation and/or monetary profligacy. Of course, Bill has less than no
expectation for governments to get anything right, so his view is consistent
with a soft depression.

I think there is a 70% chance we Muddle Through. The dollar will drop (which
offers some good investment opportunities). It will not be fun, but then we have
all been through lots of recessions and such. After all, we did survive the
70's. The US economy will recover, as will the economies of China and Asia.

I am actually quite optimistic about the future, after we meet the challenging
times of global rebalancing. I think the boom after that could be even bigger
than the last one, but we have to cross the river of balancing world trade
first. It will be a difficult crossing.

[padmee]

Mardi 15/03/05

JAPON Commandes de machines-outils (février, final, préc. +30.4 % en un an)
Rapport de la Bank of Japan sur l’économie



« Dans l'esprit du Zen et du Budo, la vie quotidienne devient le lieu de combat. C'est à chaque instant qu'il faut être conscient, en se levant, en travaillant, en mangeant, en se couchant. Là est la maîtrise ! »
- Taisen Deshimaru -

[riteam]

ça resume le dernier post?

C'est chaud sur le nikkei.

[padmee]

Le moral des industriels japonais au plus bas [ 01/04/05 - 08H38 ]


L'indice établi par l'enquête trimestrielle de la Banque du Japon a perdu 8 points en mars, soit la plus forte dégradation depuis la baisse de 17 points de septembre 2001

Le moral des entrepreneurs japonais s'est nettement dégradé en mars, révèle l'enquête trimestrielle de la Banque du Japon. Le ralentissement des exportations inquiète les grands industriels nippons alors que les ventes à l'étranger ont constitué ces trois dernières années un moteur essentiel de la reprise économique dans l'Archipel. La hausse des prix des matières premières renforçant ce sentiment de défiance, l'indice de diffusion de l'enquête publiée aujourd'hui est tombé, pour la grande industrie, à +14 contre +22 en décembre, et +23 anticipé par les économistes.
Cette baisse de huit points est la plus forte depuis celle de 17 points enregistrée en septembre 2001. Elle intervient surtout après un trimestre précédent de baisse, en décembre, alors que l'indice n'avait cessé de remonter depuis son plus bas niveau à -38 atteint en mars 2002.
La plupart des secteurs de la grande industrie sont affectés. L'indice de diffusion pour les grandes entreprises non industrielles est en revanche resté inchangé en mars à +11, comme dans l'enquête précédente, mais il déçoit dans la mesure où le marché attendait +12.

Publicité


Quoi qu'il en soit, la grande industrie ne prévoit pas de changement des conditions à venir, et l'indice de diffusion est attendu stable pour le prochain trimestre (juin) à +14.
De son côté, le gouvernement japonais continue de croire au mouvement de reprise.
«L'économie dans son ensemble est en phase de consolidation. Les chiffres soulignent de manière générale une tendance de reprise», a déclaré le ministre de l'Économie Heizo Takenaka. Certains économistes soulignent que la résistance du secteur non industriel est un signe encourageant, comme peut l'être la relative vigueur des projets d'investissement pour le nouvel exercice, qui commence aujourd'hui.

[padmee]

Japon-Chine : un partenariat sous tension
LE MONDE | 31.03.05 | 13h57 • Mis à jour le 31.03.05 | 13h57






n 1989, le PDG de Sony, Akio Morita, et celui qui n'est pas encore gouverneur de Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, publient un livre au titre provocant : No te ieru Nihon, en français "Le Japon qui peut dire non". La cible est américaine. Il s'agit de montrer au grand voisin que l'affirmation politique est le prolongement naturel de la domination économique. La crise japonaise conduira finalement à plus de retenue.


Quinze ans plus tard, un scénario un peu similaire se met en place : des politiciens nationalistes élèvent à nouveau la voix, mais le voisin visé est désormais chinois. S'il y a un fait nouveau le Japon peut compter sur le complice américain , l'Archipel s'appuie d'abord, comme avant, sur la puissance de ses entreprises. Ces dernières démontrent que, loin de les menacer, l'émergence économique de l'empire du Milieu est un atout, si elles continuent à faire la course en tête devant leurs concurrentes chinoises. Pour l'heure, à coups d'investissements technologiques et d'innovation, le pari est gagné !

Le Japon a réussi à entraîner la Chine dans une intégration économique verticale, sous contrôle. La relation politique est tendue il n'y a pas eu de visites bilatérales entre dirigeants depuis l'arrivée aux affaires, en avril 2001, de Junichiro Koizumi, le premier ministre japonais , mais les entreprises japonaises ont 18 % de part de marché en Chine et possèdent 15 % du stock d'investissement étranger, si l'on exclut les faux investisseurs venant de Hongkong, en fait des entreprises chinoises qui veulent bénéficier des privilèges réservés aux étrangers. En 2004, la Chine a dépassé les Etats-Unis comme premier partenaire commercial du Japon, avec nombre de produits en provenance de Chine mais réalisées par des entreprises japonaises et surtout grâce à une forte progression de leurs exportations (+ 160 % en cinq ans).

Les travailleurs chinois assemblent dans des filiales d'entreprises nippones des composants à forte valeur ajoutée pour fabriquer des produits conçus sur place qui seront vendus... dans l'Archipel ou sur les marchés des autres pays industrialisés. Les firmes "concèdent" également à la Chine la fabrication de produits amortis et banalisés les téléviseurs couleur, par exemple , mais "réservent" au Japon les produits de pointe : les postes avec écran à cristaux liquides. Et pour être sûrs que la hiérarchie ne sera pas remise en question, les efforts de la recherche et du développement localisés en Chine sont limités, les managers sont promus seulement en petit nombre et contrôlés : tout se passe dans la "boîte noire" japonaise conçue pour que la technologie soit "inimitable" et perde son efficacité hors de l'entreprise qui l'a fait naître.

La Chine ne reste naturellement pas les bras ballants. Elle arrive tard dans la course technologique mais il est plus difficile d'innover que d'imiter. Elle s'appuie sur ses scientifiques formés à l'étranger. Ses universités produisent des promotions d'ingénieurs inégalées... en nombre. Cependant, elle compte plus sur les transferts de compétences des investisseurs étrangers venus en masse et auxquels on impose généralement un partenaire local. La diffusion de savoir-faire est limitée.

Françoise Lemoine, Guillaume Gaulier, économistes au CEPII (Centre d'études prospectives et informations internationales) constatent : "L'élévation en contenu technologique des importations et exportations chinoises semble être restée strictement confinée à la production et aux bases d'exportations créées par les firmes asiatiques en Chine." Et comme le Japon dans le même temps investit massivement dans la recherche, avec ou sans le concours de l'Etat, l'écart, loin de se réduire, se creuse à nouveau : les entreprises rapatrient même quelques-unes de leurs unités de production dans l'Archipel, dans des délocalisations à rebours en quelque sorte. Face à l'imperium du moindre coût, la firme nippone valorise la différenciation permanente des produits. Elle joue sur la vitesse d'adaptation et d'innovation. Le circuit doit être court : ingénieurs, fournisseurs et consommateurs tests et complices sont en interaction permanente. Il faut être au Japon.

Cette intégration hiérarchisée emporte des conséquences au-delà des échanges économiques. Elle suscite l'illusion chez les dirigeants japonais d'une possible politique autonome en direction de la Chine, menée en toute impunité, serait-on tenté d'écrire, en regardant le XXe plutôt que le XXIe siècle. D'où l'étrange ballet du premier ministre japonais autour du temple Yasukuni de Tokyo où sont enterrés des responsables japonais condamnés pour crimes de guerre en 1948 ; une telle politique, en conséquence, alimentant des crispations chinoises, et une compétition diplomatique en Asie du Sud-Est pour l'accès aux ressources naturelles, potentiellement déstabilisante là où la recherche de coopérations devrait être privilégiée.

La Chine et le Japon font le grand écart entre tension politique et intégration économique. Leur géographie est pourtant leur destinée. Et si le Japon revendique légitimement aujourd'hui un statut de pays normal, il faut aussi rappeler qu'au XXIe siècle, normalité n'implique pas nécessairement retour à un nationalisme un peu désuet.

Il y a un autre défi tout aussi exaltant et "global" pour l'archipel. La Chine émergente déplace des masses énormes qui peuvent déstabiliser la mondialisation, le Japon a donc aussi la responsabilité de favoriser une intégration harmonieuse de son voisin dans la région, dans l'économie mondiale.

Dans 2046, le film du cinéaste hongkongais Wong Kar Wai, une Chinoise amoureuse d'un Japonais se voit opposer le refus d'un père habité par un fort ressentiment antijaponais. "Issho ni ikanai ka ?", "Pourquoi ne partirions-nous pas ensemble ?", lui susurre son amant japonais. Le père finira par céder...

Denis Tersen enseigne le financement du développement à l'Institut d'études politiques de Paris
Article paru dans l'édition du 01.04.05

[riteam]

Bonjour.



Un retour sur 11200, voir 10900 parrait inéluctable. Le surachat pèse lourdement sur la fourchette jaune.

[riteam]

Bonjour.

Cliquez pour agrandir

Sortie de fourchette en cours, ça glisse.

[padmee]

Bonjour,

Riteam,
aurais tu un graphe fourchettes en weeky, stp
Merci!